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Abstract 
Whereas a centralized energy supply system is still dominant today, the energy sector is 
currently witnessing the development of small-scale and more geographically dispersed 
generation units, so-called distributed generation technologies. The alignment framework 
proposes a very useful approach to look at this evolution. Yet, we argue in this paper that this 
framework does not fully take into account the inertia associated with past technological and 
institutional choices that may hinder future changes. Relying on the concept of socio-technical 
lock-in, we illustrate this point with the case of the diffusion of distributed generation 
technologies. Based on this analysis, we propose an adaptation of the alignment framework to 
integrate these elements.   
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1. Introduction 
The energy sector is currently undergoing deep changes compared to its historical 
configuration, both at the institutional and technological levels. Indeed, whereas a centralized 
model has been dominant for a long time, this sector is currently witnessing the development, 
favored by the evolution of ICT, of small-scale and more geographically dispersed generation 
units, so-called distributed generation technologies. Parallel to this, liberalization processes 
have been implemented in most developed countries to unbundle the main steps of the value 
chain that were formerly integrated in one same company. 
The so-called alignment framework is a particularly relevant angle to look at these 
transformations, because it precisely focuses on the institutional and technological changes 
simultaneously and on the interactions between these two aspects. However, although 
significant progress has been made on that respect, we argue in the present paper that this 
framework remains somewhat too static and does not fully take into account the genuine 
dynamics of institutional and technological evolutions. We suggest that the economic 
literature concerned with increasing returns to adoption, path-dependence and lock-in effects 
and, in particular, the concept of “socio-technical lock-in”, can usefully contribute to solve 
this problem. To show this, we apply it to the case of the diffusion of distributed generation 
(DG) technologies and the various technological and institutional innovations that this process 
involves. 
In section 2, we present the background of the analysis, describing the traditional centralized 
organization of the energy system and how the liberalization process has dramatically altered 
this model at the institutional level, while the technological coordination has essentially 
remained unchanged. Then, we briefly describe what DG technologies are and present their 
potential benefits, mostly from an environmental point-of-view. Section 3 presents the method 
that is used and the theories that are mobilized. First, we describe the alignment framework in 
its static version and describe the efforts made to make it dynamic. Then, we introduce the 
notion of increasing returns to adoption and explain how the latter can lead to a situation of 
technological “lock-in”. In a third step, we extend this notion of lock-in to a broader spectrum 
beyond a mere technological vision, relying on the concept of “socio-technical system” and, 
on this basis, we define the notion of “socio-technical lock-in”. In section 4, we apply the 
latter on the case of the diffusion of distributed generation technologies. To do so, we identify 
six sources of lock-in. We illustrate each of them with the case of DG. In section 5, we 
3 
 
conclude and discuss the findings of this analysis and explain the theoretical implications for 
the alignment framework.        
2. The background 
 
2.1. The traditional centralized model and the liberalization process 
At the technological level, the dominant model of energy infrastructure, due to historical and 
technological reasons, is characterized by large centralized power stations generally located 
close to sources of fossil fuels and remote from demand, which supply huge grids run by 
regional or national monopolies. The energy sector has emerged as a vertically and 
horizontally integrated system with important technical interdependencies (Künneke, 2008). 
This configuration allowed to benefit from economies of scale, network externalities and 
other types of increasing returns to adoption, as we will see below.  
At the institutional level, before the wave of liberalization that has swept most industrial 
countries in the last twenty years, the energy sector was historically institutionalized along 
with this technological configuration, according to a highly hierarchical and centralized 
organization. It was vertically integrated, which means that firms operating in the different 
functions of the energy value chain, i.e. production, network activities and sales, were 
strongly interconnected through ownership rights, contracts and regulation (Künneke, 2008).  
Liberalization, in turn, implied, “the decoupling of major parts of the value chain into 
independent entities” (Finger, Groenewegen et al., 2005: 245). Network related activities–
transmission and distribution–remained subject to sector specific regulation, because they are 
considered natural monopolies and, therefore, could not be exposed to competitive markets. 
“On the other hand, production, trade, metering and sales are considered as commercial 
activities that can be performed under market conditions” (Finger, Groenewegen et al., 2005: 
245)
2
.  
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 In practice, however, although the liberalization process significantly changed the European landscape of the 
power industry, institutions are still strongly marked by the traditional trajectory. Indeed, according to 
DTI/Ofgem (2006), the market and regulatory models adopted at privatization reflected the predominantly 
centralized model of transmission and distribution. In a recent study, Matthes, Grashof et al. (2007) empirically 
identify different development patterns. While in the UK and Scandinavian countries, power generation is quite 
competitive and unconcentrated, market concentration in continental Europe remains very high. 
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2.2. What are distributed generation technologies? 
While many definitions of distributed generation technologies exist
3
, distributed generation 
(DG) technologies are, according to the EU Electricity Directive (Communities, 2009), 
generations units connected to distribution systems. In addition to this criterion, the literature 
often emphasizes the following basic elements: they are small generation units, typically 
ranging from less than a kW to tens of MW, which are geographically dispersed and located 
close to load centers. In the context of the major environmental challenges linked with climate 
change and greenhouse gas emissions, it is increasingly recognized that they represent a more 
sustainable model of power supply, for several reasons (e.g. Goldemberg, Johansson et al., 
1988; Johansson, Kelly et al., 1993). First of all, a large segment of the DG market is 
constituted by combined heat and power production (CHP) units. These units are expected to 
enhance energy conservation and, subsequently, to reduce CO2 emissions, due to a higher 
overall efficiency through the simultaneous production of heat and electricity. It is worth 
mentioning that CHP units are at the moment mostly based on fossil fuels, but they have the 
potential to be fuelled by renewables in the future. Secondly, while the development of 
renewable energy sources, such as photovoltaic or wind, appears to be an essential tool in the 
fight against climate change, most renewables, except for large hydro, have a decentralized 
nature. Hence, “most government policies that aim to promote the use of renewables will also 
result in an increased impact of distributed generation technologies” (Pepermans, Driesen et 
al., 2005: 790). Thirdly, aside from reductions in carbon emissions due to enhanced 
technological efficiency (in the case of CHP) and zero carbon emissions (in the case of 
renewables), empirical studies show that DG technologies may also induce a shift in 
consumption behaviors towards lower levels of energy consumption and through load 
shifting
4
 by increasing consumers’ awareness of their energy use and it impacts (Haas, 
Ornetzeder et al., 1999; Dobbyn and Thomas, 2005; Bahaj and James, 2007; Keirstead, 2007). 
Overall, "a system with a large amount of DG is considered an environmentally friendly 
alternative to the traditional power supply system" (Wolsink, 2012: 823). Figure 1 shows the 
share of DG in electricity production in European countries.  
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Figure 1: DG shares in total electricity generation in EU-25 countries, 2004.  
 
Source: Cossent, Gómez et al. (2009). 
As we can see, there are significant differences between countries, which can reflect their 
different abilities to overcome the barriers impeding the diffusion of DG. Denmark, for 
instance, is the European country with the highest share of DG (above 45% in 2004). 
Consistently, according to Skytte and Ropenus (2005), the regulatory barriers to DG 
penetration in Denmark are significantly lower than in other European countries
5
. 
3. Theory and methods 
 
3.1. Methodological approach 
From the theoretical point-of-view, we heavily rely on the economic analysis of technological 
evolution and, in particular, on the concepts of increasing returns to adoption, path-
dependence and lock-in. However, technology is not an artifact isolated from the rest of social 
reality. Hence, we advocate an extended vision of the process of lock-in, what we call socio-
technical lock-in, rooted in the concept of socio-technical system. In order to make this 
theoretical framework applicable, we define socio-technical lock-in as composed of six 
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empirically identifiable dimensions, extending Unruh (2002)’s analysis: institutional, 
technological, organizational, industrial, societal and psychological. 
We start our analysis by addressing the three basic questions that are central in the alignment 
framework: 1) What is performance in the context of the energy sector? 2) What is alignment 
in the context of the energy sector? And 3) Who are the actors involved? Then, we investigate 
each of the aforementioned dimensions through the case of the diffusion of DG technologies. 
To do so, we conducted an extensive literature review that enabled to capture the different 
existing barriers to the diffusion of DG in each dimension. We tried to illustrate these barriers 
with concrete situations in different European countries.    
We proceed to our analysis mostly at a systemic level, seeking to emphasize the links and 
interactions between the different dimensions rather than an in-depth investigation of one of 
them
6. In this sense, our perspective is close to the one promoted by the “Dutch” School of 
transition researchers (Kemp, Schot et al., 1998; Geels, 2002, 2011; Kemp, 2011), who 
integrate energy transformations into a larger picture of social, institutional and economic 
change. This approach is perfectly compatible with the alignment framework, since network 
industries are conceived in the latter “as complex socio-technical systems in which 
technological and institutional elements are strongly interwoven” (Crettenand and Finger, 
2013: 107).    
3.2. The alignment framework 
The fundamental idea underlying the alignment framework, developed by authors such as 
Finger, Künneke, Groenewegen, Ménard and Crettenand (Finger, Groenewegen et al., 2005; 
Künneke and Finger, 2007; Künneke, Groenewegen et al., 2010; Crettenand and Finger, 
2013), is that network industries require a certain degree of coherence between institutions 
and technology in order to ensure a satisfactory level of performance. Indeed, as we have seen 
through the case of the energy sector, most network industries have undergone a process of 
liberalization at the institutional level. However, some activities, e.g. the electricity grid, 
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conflicting views between actors and temporary periods of competition between different regimes, as illustrated 
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remained monopolistic due to technical and economic factors. Consistently, Finger, 
Groenewegen et al. (2005) claimed that liberalization introduced some incoherence between 
“a now liberalized institutional environment on the one hand and the current state of the 
technology on the other” (Crettenand and Finger, 2013: 109). The alignement framework has 
up to now been applied to industries such as electricity (Künneke, 2008), railways (Künneke 
and Finger, 2007; Perennes, 2013), air transport (Finger, Groenewegen et al., 2005) or 
telecommunications (Anker and Lemstra, 2013).   
Recent versions of the alignment framework put a particular emphasis on the role of actors in 
shaping the co-evolution of institutions and technologies. Three categories of actors are 
distinguished: institutional actors, who are capable of shaping the institutions under which 
all other actors, including themselves, behave (political authorities, public administrations, 
regulators). technological actors, who have the capabilities to innovate and develop 
technologies (R&D departments in firms, Universities and research labs), and market actors, 
who provide the services of a given network industry. In this framework, consumers are not 
explicitly actors as such, but as far as DG technologies are concerned, it is useful to consider 
consumers in a more active fashion, because they can exert a significant influence on the 
diffusion of these technologies, becoming in some cases producers themselves –so-called 
“prosumers”–as we will see below. 
Finally, pointing out the fact that the initial version of the framework, as presented by Finger, 
Groenewegen et al. (2005), was mainly static, Finger, Crettenand et al. (2010) addressed the 
task of introducing a dynamic perspective within it. Consistently, they argued that network 
industries can be characterized by three main configurations: 1) public monopoly, either 
public or private (in the context of so-called public-private partnerships), 2) competition over 
existing networks and 3) Competition of networks. The dynamics in network industries is 
thus seen as the shift from one configuration to another and is driven simultaneously by 
institutional and technological changes. At the institutional level, the driving force is mainly 
the liberalization process, which tends to disintegrate the traditional centralized authority into 
unbundled and decentralized entities while, at the technological level, ICTs are the primary 
driver toward more distributed infrastructures. Figure 2 depicts the co-evolution between 
institutions and technology as conceptualized in this adapted version of the alignment 
framework. 
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Figure 2: the co-evolution between institutions and technology in the case of network 
industries 
 
Source: Crettenand and Finger (2013) 
However, the dynamic process is not analyzed further. In particular, the transition from one 
configuration to another implies important costs, which arise from the inertia of past 
technological and institutional choices and these are not taken into account. Hereafter we 
review the main works that have explored this question.   
3.3. Introducing increasing returns in the picture 
In their seminal work, whose perspective was mainly technological, David (1985) and Arthur 
(1989) described the path-dependent process that can lead to market domination of a 
technology over another. They show, in particular, that this process depends on small 
historical circumstances and that the winning technology is not necessarily the most efficient 
one. The cornerstone of this approach lies in the concept of increasing returns to adoption 
(IRA), which are defined as “positive feedback that increases the attractiveness of a given 
technology when it is more and more adopted” (Maréchal, 2007).  
Four types of IRA are identified in the literature: economies of scale, learning effects, 
adaptive expectations and network externalities. Economies of scale refer to the decrease in 
unit production costs associated with the increase in the production volume, while learning 
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effects lower the costs as skills and experience increases with the cumulated production 
(Arrow, 1962). These first two types have been extensively studied by economists, who rely 
on them to build “learning curves”. Adaptive expectations occur as the further adoption of a 
technology decreases both producers’ and purchasers’ uncertainty about its general quality 
and performance (Arthur and Lane, 1991). The last type of increasing returns, so-called 
“network externalities”, refers to the situation in which the benefits of using a technology are 
positively associated with the number or share of other users of the same technology. These 
increasing returns create path-dependence in the evolution of technologies, which can 
eventually generate a lock-in situation.  
Examples given in the literature of apparently inferior technologies that have been locked-in 
as dominant designs include the QWERTY keyboard (David, 1985)–to the expense of 
superior keyboard designs such as the Dvorak keyboard–, VHS video tape (Arthur, 1990) –
versus the Betamax technology– and light-water nuclear reactors (Cowan, 1990). It is worth 
mentioning, however, that the hypothesis according to which path-dependent processes lead 
to locked-in inferior designs raised strong criticisms (Liebowitz and Margolis, 1990, 1994, 
1995). At the heart of this controversy lies the presumed superiority of locked-out 
technological alternatives, which is intrinsically difficult to prove empirically, what Cowan 
and Foray (2002) called the problem of the “counterfactual threat”.  
According to Foray (1997), two periods can be distinguished in all the cases of lock-in 
processes mentioned above. The initial one is characterized by constant or very low 
increasing returns. Indeed, as long as the time series is not “long enough for the agent 
involved to be able to use it to form consistent probability estimates about future possible 
states of the world”, the process is determined by natural preferences, which are themselves 
historically shaped, rather than by increasing returns, and leads to “a distribution of choices 
that reflects preferences and which is not influenced by any local or global precedents”. Then, 
in a second period, the system starts exhibiting some dynamic complementarities and positive 
feedbacks, which tend to reinforce and amplify the initial distribution of choices.  
3.4. An extension of the concept of lock-in 
 
3.4.1. The concept of socio-technical system 
It appears more and more clearly that the study of large technical systems and, in particular, 
the energy industry, should go beyond the mere technological and physical aspects to embrace 
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the institutional, social and psychological processes at play (Sauter and Watson, 2007a; 
Owens and Driffill, 2008). As Hughes (1983: 2) puts it, “Electric power systems made in 
different societies – as well as in different times – involve certain basic technical components 
and connections, but variations in the basic essentials often reveal variations in resources, 
traditions, political arrangements, and economic practices from one society to another and 
from one time to another. In a sense, electric power systems, like so much other technology, 
are both causes and effects of social changes”.  
Starting from the idea that increasing returns do not only arise from a technological 
perspective, various attempts were made to broaden the concept of technological lock-in 
consistently with this systemic approach. An important step was made by North (1990), who 
applied Arthur’s analysis to the field of economic and social institutions. He shows that in a 
world with institutional increasing returns, if markets are imperfect and characterized by 
substantial transaction costs, inefficient institutional paths can prevail in the long run. Unruh 
(2000) suggests the notion of techno-institutional complex to capture the interactions between 
technological systems and public and private institutions. These complexes “emerge through 
synergistic coevolution initiated by technological increasing returns and perpetuated by the 
emergence of dominant technological, organizational and institutional designs” (Unruh, 2000: 
826). Dosi (1982) goes further and highlights, through the notion of technological paradigm, 
the existence of lock-ins of ideas, which are “shaped by the cognitive frame of actors and 
therefore determine exploration frontiers” (Maréchal, 2007: 5187). 
In line with this theoretical tradition, we will consider the energy sector as a socio-technical 
system (STS), defined as “a cluster of interrelated components connected in a network or 
infrastructure that includes physical, social and informational elements and that thus involves 
technology, science, regulation, user practices, markets, cultural meaning, infrastructure, 
production and supply networks” (Maréchal, 2010: 1105). Using the typology of increasing 
returns presented above, it is worth stressing the peculiar importance of network externalities 
in this vision in terms of STS, since “they are thought to operate on technological systems that 
consist not only of multiple interrelated technologies and their supporting infrastructures, but 
also of technical, informational, economic and institutional relationships that enable them to 
work together” (Maréchal, 2007: 5187).     
 
3.4.2. The notion of socio-technical lock-in 
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The close interconnections between these different components have important consequences 
on the development and evolution of STS, particularly for attempts to make rather radical 
changes to current systems, since such changes are not solely a technical challenge. Indeed, 
there exist barriers to change of different nature that are necessary to further explore in order 
to apprehend the dynamics of STS. Applied to STS, the concept of socio-technical lock-in 
thus designates the combined interaction of technological, institutional, economic and socio-
cultural forces that mutually reinforce themselves to create inertia in the technological 
trajectories of our economies. Extending Unruh (2002)’s analysis, we argue that a socio-
technical lock-in can arise from six main sources that are inextricably interconnected: 
technological, institutional, organizational, industrial, societal and psychological. 
Consistently with the concept of lock-in, each of these sources may constitute a barrier to the 
diffusion of DG technologies. 
4. Analysis: an application to the case of the energy sector and the diffusion of 
distributed generation technologies 
 
4.1. What is performance? 
It is difficult to provide a clear-cut definition of performance in network industries, due to the 
complexity of the relationships between their different components. Initially, Finger, 
Groenewegen et al. (2005) distinguished three categories of infrastructure performance, 
namely economic performance, public value and technical integrity. In their attempt to refine 
this definition of performance, Crettenand and Finger (2013) divided the public value 
dimension into social and environmental performance and added an operational dimension, 
which gives the following elements: 
- Technical: availability, physical losses (e.g., kWh per km), delivered service per 
capita (e.g., kWh per capita); 
- Social: consumer satisfaction, accessibility, affordability, quality of service, 
safeguarding privacy; 
- Operational: reliability/safety, use of the network, congestion; 
- Environmental: Greenhouse gas emissions per kWh; 
- Economic: price evolution in the sector, subsidies, production costs (costs per kWh), 
productivity. 
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On the basis of this element, we suggest that a high-performance energy system could be 
defined as follows:  
Proposition 1: a high-performance energy system is a system characterized by universal 
access to energy services, combined with security and reliability of supply from efficient, low-
carbon sources.  
4.2. What is alignment? 
As we have seen, liberalization resulted in the unbundling and the decoupling of the 
institutional governance in the energy sector, while the technical coordination, especially the 
administration of transmission and distribution systems, is still a regulated monopoly. This 
leads Finger, Groenewegen et al. (2005: 248) to the conclusion that “prior to liberalization 
there was a high degree of coherence between the institutional and technical coordination of 
the sectors activities. Liberalization resulted in a novel institutional structure of the sector, 
leaving the technical coordination unchanged. Consequently, technical and institutional 
coordination are incoherent”. 
Consistently, these authors, along with other scholars advocate the development of a more 
decentralized and fragmented technological energy system in order to make liberalization 
successful. As Künneke (2008) puts it, “There are innovative technologies that allow the 
production of electricity even at the level of private households […] If this technical 
development breaks through, a new technical paradigm will occur that would fundamentally 
change the technological practice of this sector. This would allow for a technical 
decomposition (i.e. fragmentation) of the electricity system. Obviously, this technological 
practice would fit much better to the institutional framework of a liberalised market” 
(Künneke, 2008; italics added). In line with this vision, alignment in the energy sector is 
defined as follows: 
Proposition 2: alignment in the energy sector refers to the evolution of the technological 
coordination toward a more distributed mode of control to match the liberalized institutional 
environment
7
. Such alignment implies the multiplication of distributed generation 
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 This is the definition of alignment from the technical perspective. It should be noted, however, that alignment 
can also be seen from the institutional perspective. Alignment would then be defined as the process of re-
centralization of the institutional coordination, to be coherent with the centralistic technical coordination.    
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technologies and the parallel technical adaptation of networks to deal with this evolution, in 
particular the development of so-called “intelligent networks or “smart grids”8. 
4.3. Who are the actors involved? 
DG technologies may represent important innovative aspects, both at the institutional and 
technological levels, for a wide range of actors. If we use the vocabulary of the alignment 
framework presented above, they represent innovations for market actors, such as utilities 
supplying power generation or electricity network operators, especially distribution network 
operators. Indeed, these actors will have to deal with the installation of new designs, new 
network components, a new configuration of the ownership structure, new market entrances, 
etc. Institutional actors, such as regulators, will be affected, through, for instance, the 
implementation of incentives to facilitate the integration of DG technologies to networks or 
the replacement and upgrading of existing network infrastructure. Finally, technological 
actors will have to deal with new technical challenges involved, for example, by the technical 
integration of DG to grids, the conception of new metering systems, etc. Finally, a specific 
role will be by consumers, who will be more actively engaged, while there has historically 
been very little consumer involvement in energy generation. 
Proposition 3: the diffusion of DG technologies affects all the different types of actors: market 
actors, institutional actors, technological actors, as well as consumers. The number and type 
of concerned actors depends on the national contexts and the specific market concentration 
and organization of the different countries.  
4.4. The interest of a historical approach 
In relation with the concept of performance defined above, we have already explained how 
DG technologies may enhance the environmental performance of energy systems by limiting 
greenhouse emissions. We will see below that they may also represent technical and 
regulatory advantages, such as the improvement of power supply or the provision of some 
ancillary services. However, they also represent a genuine challenge at many levels, precisely 
due to the aforementioned path-dependent and lock-in processes. Indeed, if they are installed 
in sufficient numbers, DG technologies could be highly disruptive for current energy systems 
(Sauter and Watson, 2007a). In turn, their development depends on the willingness to accept 
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 Smart grids refer to upgraded electricity grids that use information and communication technologies to optimize 
generation, distribution and consumption by gathering and acting on information about suppliers’ and 
consumers’ behaviors in an automated fashion. 
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the key aspects of the innovation that they imply among society and its different actors 
(consumers, producers, network opertators, authorities, etc).   
However, despite the innovative nature, in many respects, of such technologies with regard to 
the conventional centralized model of power generation, the exploration of past events 
required by an historical approach leads to consider the current support for DG technologies 
as a “renewed interest for an old locked-out strategy” (Maréchal, 2012: 141) rather than a 
genuinely new discovery of their benefits. Indeed, during the period 1887-1892, there was an 
intense rivalry between the proponents of two technologies competing for the electricity 
supply market, namely Edison’s incumbent direct or “continuous” current system (DC) versus 
Westinghouse’s alternating current (AC) technology (Hughes, 1983; David and Bunn, 1988). 
Both technologies had their own benefits and disadvantages: DC was more efficient, but was 
distance-constrained for technical reasons linked to voltage drops, while AC enabled to 
deliver electric power over a much longer distance. AC technology eventually won the 
market, which led to the emergence of the current model characterized by large centralized 
generation units located close to fossil fuels supplying huge distribution grids run by regional 
or national monopolies, whereas “DC technology would have required a more decentralized 
system of competing local generation and distribution” (Unruh, 2000: 821). In that respect, 
the case of DG technologies very eloquently illustrates the crucial importance of introducing 
historical perspectives in economics. 
4.5. The application of the concept of socio-technical lock-in to energy systems 
 
4.5.1. The technological dimension 
The basic technological concern involves interconnecting DG without negatively affecting the 
“conditions of supply that ensure that end-use equipment and infrastructure can operate safely 
and effectively” (Passey, Spooner et al., 2011), conditions known as “power quality 
requirements”. Distribution networks have not been conceived to deal with the integration of 
a large number of DG units. For example, traditional centralized power networks involve 
power flow in one direction only, from higher voltage levels to lower voltage levels, i.e. from 
power plant to transmission network, to distribution network, to load. Yet a large number of 
DG installations may significantly change power flows, which can be potentially bi-
directional (Dondi, Bayoumi et al., 2002).  
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The relation between distributed generation and power quality is ambivalent. On the one 
hand, distributed generation can contribute to solve specific power quality problems. For 
instance, in areas where voltage support is difficult, distributed generation can have a positive 
impact because connecting DG generally leads to a rise in voltage in the network (IEA, 2002). 
Dondi et al. (2002) also mention the potential positive effects of distributed generation for 
voltage support and power factor corrections. On the other hand, the connection of a large 
number of DG raises some important technical issues as far as power quality is concerned. 
The main ones are the following:  
- Voltage fluctuation and regulation, which refers to a change or swing in voltage and 
affects many consumer devices. This first category of technical issues can be divided 
into voltage imbalance, voltage rise leading to reverse power flow, and power output 
fluctuation (Passey, Spooner et al., 2011). DG technologies are concerned by voltage 
regulation, because they are both affected by voltage fluctuations occurring on the grid 
and can be the cause of voltage fluctuations themselves. 
- System frequency: the frequency is controlled by maintaining a balance between the 
connected loads and generation and should be kept within very small deviations from 
the rated value of 50 Hz, because the well-functioning of many industrial and 
household applications depends on it. The increasing penetration of decentralized 
power generating units and, in particular, those relying on intermittent energy sources 
such as wind and solar, makes frequency control more difficult (Passey, Spooner et al., 
2011).  
- Unintentional islanding: this situation occurs when “distributed generation delivers 
power to the network even after circuit breakers have disconnected that part of the 
network from the main grid and associated generators” (Passey, Spooner et al., 2011: 
6285). This raises important safety considerations for the repair personnel working on 
the lines (Pepermans, Driesen et al., 2005), among other problems. 
 
4.5.2. The institutional dimension 
Institutional features include elements such as “government policy intervention, legal 
frameworks, departments/ministries” (Unruh, 2002). As far as DG is concerned, the main 
source of institutional lock-in arises from regulatory frameworks in place and, in particular, 
regulation of distribution system operators (DSOs) activities. Indeed, the latter are key players 
in this issue, since DG are directly connected to distribution networks. 
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The traditional regulatory scheme for DSOs is a cost of service or rate of return regulation, 
based on actual audited distribution costs. However, rate of return regulation has been 
criticized, because it tends to encourage over-investment and does not provide DSOs with 
incentives to increase efficiency in the distribution activity. Therefore, in the context of 
liberalized electricity systems, performance based regulation or incentive regulation has been 
implemented as an alternative. This mechanism accounts for the existent asymmetries of 
information between the regulator and the utilities and aims at promoting efficiency in the 
long-term by indexing the remuneration of distribution to the service provided instead of 
incurred costs. Incentive regulation has already been implemented in a majority of EU 
member states as a remuneration scheme for DSOs (Cossent, Gómez et al., 2009). 
Financial barriers: there are two different kinds of network charges: connection charges, 
which are paid only once to compensate for the costs of connection to the network, and use-
of-system (UoS) charges, that are regularly paid by network users, mostly consumers. As 
regards connection charges, three different schemes are identified: deep, shallow and 
shallowish. In the deep charge approach, DG bears all the network reinforcement costs, 
whereas under shallow and shallowish charges, DG needs to pay only the reinforcement costs 
within the immediate area, or even not at all. The use of deep connection charges is seen as a 
major barrier of entry for small-sized DG developers (Skytte and Ropenus, 2005). A 
recommendation would be to switch to shallower connections charges and to socialize 
reinforcement costs among the network users through UoS charges. While the majority of 
EU-15 member states have adopted shallow connection charges, most new member states still 
present deep connection charges (Cossent, Gómez et al., 2009).      
Another financial barrier for the development of DG lies in imbalance penalties (Skytte and 
Ropenus, 2005). As many renewable-based and CHP DG projects are characterized by the 
intermittency and non-dispatchability of power generation, they may suffer financial penalties 
if energy supply and demand do not match, which can prevent them from entering from 
wholesale markets. This problem does not arise in the case of a small project that is part of the 
generating portfolio of large, vertically integrated utilities, since these risks can be balanced 
within this portfolio. “However, independently owned projects face high transaction costs and 
imbalance risks, and therefore tend to sell output to a third party, usually an electricity 
supplier. This does not necessarily remove the risk of imbalance penalties, as the third party is 
likely to offer a price that factors in the impact of imbalance changes on its own market 
participation” (Woodman and Baker, 2008: 4528). The case of the UK is a good illustration of 
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this problem: current market arrangements in this country–called British Electricity Trading 
and Transmission Arrangements (BETTA)– were conceived according to the characteristics 
of conventional generation and aim at rewarding dispatchable output. This can favor 
centralized generation to the detriment of small-scale and unpredictable generators because, 
on the one hand, emphasis is made on costs, which creates incentives to pursue economies of 
scale in both generation and trading and, on the other hand, because BETTA requires 
generators to predict output in advance (Woodman and Baker, 2008).     
Lack of incentives: there are several important aspects as far as incentive mechanisms are 
concerned. First, the aforementioned technological challenges associated with the 
multiplication of DG technologies imply upgrading, reinforcing or replacing the current 
network assets. This, in turn, requires departing from the traditional “fit and forget” approach, 
i.e. the passive network operation philosophy, and considering distribution grids in a more 
active way. As Frías, Gómez et al. (2009: 446) put it,  “If an active network management 
philosophy is adopted, the amounts of DG that can be accommodated with limited 
investments will be larger”. However, the current regulatory framework offers little incentive 
for DSOs to accomplish this work. For instance, most of the revenue of DSOs comes from 
charging consumers, and only a small part from UoS charges paid by DG connected to their 
networks. This can lead to a situation where DSOs are not encouraged to connect DG to their 
networks (Woodman and Baker, 2008).  
Yet DG installations do not only represent extra costs for DSOs. Indeed, DG can enable DSOs 
to avoid investments in new network infrastructure, due to the fact that DG is “connected 
close to end consumers or even on their side of the meter, thus reducing the net demand to be 
supplied through transmission and distribution grids” (Cossent, Gómez et al., 2009: 1149). 
This potential of DG to replace network reinforcement has been acknowledged in the 
Engineering Recommendation P2/6. However, current regulatory mechanisms do not 
encourage DSOs to take advantage of this opportunity. Indeed, cost of service regulation does 
not trigger DSOs to exploit potential DG benefits for an efficient network expansion. As 
Woodman and Baker (2008: 4529) explain it, a DSOs “capital expenditure on equipment 
increases its regulatory asset base, and therefore the level of returns that it is eligible for in 
future”. It will thus be more profitable for a DSO to spend on its own infrastructure than 
avoiding reinforcement costs by connecting a DG installation to part of the grid. 
Implementing incentive regulation is a necessary condition to solve this problem, but might 
not be sufficient by itself (Frías, Gómez et al., 2009).   
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Finally, DG can provide a range of ancillary services that could help DSOs improve the 
efficiency of the network, like frequency regulation, voltage control… But, again, the 
regulatory framework needs to be adapted in order to provide the right incentives for taking 
advantages of these benefits from DG. For instance, an economic compensation for DG 
should be provided in exchange of ancillary services they offer. The relationships between 
DSOs and DG developers are also likely to be altered.  
Lack of unbundling: as we mentioned in section 2, unbundling requirements are an essential 
part of the liberalization process in the energy sector. “Yet the effectiveness of unbundling is 
highly dependent on their actual enforcement by the [member states]. A lack of unbundling in 
distribution may negatively impact the access conditions for new DG” (Cossent, Gómez et al., 
2009: 1151). For competition in generation to be effective, fairness and non-discrimination in 
network access should be guaranteed, all the more since networks are natural monopolies. 
This requires overcoming asymmetric information and anticompetitive behaviour created by 
DSOs. If ownership unbundling is not reinforced, there may be a risk of cross-subsidies 
between the competitive spheres and the regulated network activity, at the expense of new DG 
operators. Moreover, DSOs could favour their own DG units or those owned by their 
previously affiliated companies, for instance, for the computation of the connection charges.  
4.5.3. The industrial and organizational dimensions 
Lock-in may also arise at the industrial and organizational levels. Generally speaking, while 
incumbent companies are typically good at generating incremental innovations that enhance 
and consolidate the present order, they typically show much less ability to create superior 
innovations that could threaten their existing products and know-how accumulated through 
learning-by-doing and learning-by-using (Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Van de Ven, 1986). 
In this context, management efforts are routinized through the emergence of standard 
operating procedures (Nelson and Winter, 1982) and focus on technologically incremental 
programs, such as total quality management, standardization of procedures, etc (Unruh, 
2000). This dominant design is enforced at the industry-wide level, due to the existence of 
network externalities and coordination effects that often require the creation of codified 
standards and conventions (Könnölä and Unruh, 2007).  
Energy distribution does not escape this phenomenon, since “DSOs are usually risk adverse to 
make investments on new technologies that are not mature enough” (Cossent, Gómez et al., 
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2009: 1150). To achieve the aforementioned network transformations necessary to the 
connection of a large number of DG units, DSOs need to support innovation. In a sense, 
performance based regulation by itself encourages innovation, since any improvement in 
efficiency achieved during the whole regulatory period will benefit DSOs. Yet the length of 
regulatory periods does not generally exceed 5 years, whereas efficiency gains from R&D 
expenditures are not always realized in the short-term. In addition, incentive regulation 
triggers DSOs to reduce costs as much as possible, including innovation costs. Hence, an 
adaptation of regulatory mechanisms appears to be necessary to foster innovation. What is 
more, despite the potential benefits in terms of ancillary services provided by DG mentioned 
above, most DSOs see DG projects primarily as a source of problems for network 
management and quality of supply, mainly because of the lack of controllability and 
observability of these units and “their frequent disconnections in case of network 
disturbances” (Frías, Gómez et al., 2009: 448).  
4.5.4. The societal dimension 
At the societal level, it can be argued that, alongside technology and institutions, actors’ 
behavior is shaped by systems of socio-cultural norms and representations. In this perspective, 
it has been suggested that “The symbolic value of [large technical systems] has played an 
important role in the construction process of national electricity systems” (Sauter and Watson, 
2007a: 113). For instance, van der Vleuten (2004) has argued that the development of large 
hydropower stations has contributed to the consolidation of Swedish national identity. 
Another example is given by French nuclear plants, which have participated to the idea of 
“grande nation” and the building of French nationalism (Hecht, 1998).  
4.5.5. The psychological dimension 
These five sources of inertia can be described as structural or collective, since they arise at a 
supra-individual level. Following Maréchal (2010), we can we add a sixth dimension, which 
concerns the individual level: the psychological and behavioral components, which refer to 
the cognitive and psychological factors that open up, or close down, opportunities for the 
development of new physical or social technologies.  
To understand this, it should be noted, first of all, that the installation of DG technologies 
potentially implies new roles for consumers, who may be actively involved in the energy 
production and, therefore, become “prosumers” or “co-providers” of energy services (van 
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Vliet and Chappells, 1999; Chappells, Klintman et al., 2000). Indeed, while the construction 
of large technology projects and infrastructures like central power plants usually necessitates 
a rather passive consent by local communities and by the public in general, DG technologies, 
in turn, require a more active approval by individuals, in terms of willingness to provide space 
for the installations of these technologies, capital investments and behavioral changes in 
energy consumption. In other words, DG technologies require “households’ acceptance in 
terms of both positive public and private attitudes to achieve market up-take of these 
technologies” (Sauter and Watson, 2007b: 2772). This is particularly true for micro-
generation technologies, such as photovoltaics, micro-wind turbines and micro-CHP. If 
consumers are unaware of the existing micro-generation options, they are unlikely to create 
the demand required for this market to develop and grow (DTI/Ofgem, 2006). But it is also 
true for technologies at the community level, such as onshore wind turbines, because the 
willingness to provide space for their installation depends on people’s attitudes towards these 
technologies. Wind turbines have been the technology most subject to contention to date 
(Devine-Wright, 2007b). Wind power development has provoked considerable opposition in 
many places, due to impacts on natural landscapes, which can, in turn, affect tourism, the 
generation of noise pollution and the negative consequences for property prices and local 
fauna and flora (Warren and McFadyen, 2010).   
Yet the traditional configuration of the energy sector may hinder the development of these 
more active roles played by consumers. Indeed, far from taking place in a social vacuum, 
energy-related behavior relies on an “‘established infrastructure of taken-for-granted hardware 
or technological systems’’ (Shove and Warde, 1998, cited in Owens and Driffill, 2008). In 
this perspective, it can be argued that the traditional centralized model has enforced a “deficit” 
view of the public as energy users, “separated from, and minimally engaged in, energy 
systems over and above pressing a light switch. This has led to the design and deployment of 
a range of energy technologies, services and procedures, from meters to bills to regulatory 
institutions to power stations, that foster minimal public engagement” (Devine-Wright, 2007a: 
68). From a supply-side perspective, it has led “designers, developers and installers of new 
energy technologies [to] aim to minimize public engagement since this would be assumed to 
increase the risk of resistance, delay, planning refusal and inefficient or incorrect use of 
technologies” (Devine-Wright, 2007a: 69). Verbong, Beemsterboer et al. (2013) also 
identified several barriers to user engagement in smart grid projects.  
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Indubitably, this phenomenon is enforced by the limits of human cognition, what economists 
have usually called bounded rationality (Simon, 1955). Relying on the concept of habits, 
which can be defined as context-dependent forms of socially acquired automaticity, Maréchal 
(2010), following Barnes, Gartland et al. (2004), suggests the notion of “behavioral lock-in” 
to describe the inertia that generally characterizes individuals’ domestic energy practices. 
Indeed, while habits free up cognitive resources for more strategic issues, they may be at the 
root of conservative behavior. In line with this idea, insights from behavioral economics and 
social psychology show that people rely on a range of cognitive and emotional heuristics to 
make their decisions related with energy consumption and investments (see Baddeley (2011), 
McNamara and Grubb (2011) or Pollitt and Shaorshadze (2011) for extensive reviews) . For 
instance, based on a survey among households, Kempton and Montgomery (1982) highlight 
the use by consumers of simple rules of thumb to assess their energy consumption, which 
result in systematic underinvestment in energy-efficient assets. What is more, these decisions 
are often subject to systematic biases. As an illustration, the endowment effect (Thaler, 1980), 
i.e. the tendency of individuals to valuate goods they already own more than goods they do 
not, leads households to be reluctant to replace appliances they currently have, even if it is 
efficient to do so.  
Hence, according to a process of “circular causation” or positive feedback loop, habits tend to 
reinforce the present socio-technical system. Just like institutions evolve along with 
technology, structural factors, such as technology and institutions, co-evolve simultaneously 
with individual preferences in a mutually reinforcing fashion. As Maréchal and Lazaric 
(2012: 70) put it, “while choices in energy consumption are being strongly influenced by the 
existing carbon-based STS, they, in turn, contribute to reinforce and maintain the incumbent 
STS”. 
Figure 3 schematizes the process through which these six dimensions contribute to enforce the 
socio-technical factors and the six sources that contribute to the socio-technical lock-in in the 
energy sector. 
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Figure 3 :  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: created by the author. 
5. Discussion and conclusions: what are the implications for the alignment framework? 
The present article sought to emphasize the need to take the weight of history into account in 
the study of the co-evolution of institutions and technologies. We relied on the concept of 
socio-technical lock-in, which results from the interaction of various dynamics of increasing 
returns to adoption at the institutional and technological levels. We illustrated this process 
through the case of distributed generation technologies and identified various barriers to their 
diffusion. This has direct implications for the alignement framework, because the latter does 
not enough account for these historical factors in its current version. An updated version 
would make explicit the inertia linked to past choices and the costs associated with 
technological and institutional change, as suggested by figure 4 below:    
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Figure 4: the co-evolution between institutions and technology in network industries, 
including the forces of inertia that hinder alignment 
 
 
Source: adapted from Crettenand and Finger (2013) 
A future research agenda suggested by this study might include an application of this analysis 
to other network industries and/or other technologies, as well as more in-depth and detailed 
case studies focused on individual countries.  
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